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“God is very busy. He can’t control all the details. He’s
1
running a franchise operation.”
I.

INTRODUCTION

Decentralized control of “the details” is at once the blessing
and the curse of the franchise operation. A franchisor succeeds by
delegating the practical tasks of running its business to its
franchisees, which constitute a veritable army of motivated
entrepreneurs and managers. But by relinquishing control of its
operations to its franchisees, a franchisor entrusts important
features of its livelihood to the same army. To protect its business,
a franchisor must rely on some means of keeping its franchisees’
actions in harmony with its goals and standards. The most potent
and absolute of these means is the threat of termination or
nonrenewal of the franchise.
The consequences of termination can be dire to the
franchisee. As a result, the question of whether the government
should control the franchisor’s ability to exercise its “doomsday
option” is a controversial issue in the debate over how to foster an
2
equitable yet prosperous environment for franchise operations.
The importance of the franchise relationship to American business
underscores the high stakes of the debate. Franchises and
3
dealerships represent a significant part of the U.S. economy.
But because legislatures in many jurisdictions perceive
4
disparities in power between franchisor and franchisee, most states
have enacted franchise protection statutes that limit the
franchisor’s ability to terminate or elect not to renew the franchise,

1. NUNS ON THE RUN (Handmade Films Ltd. 1990).
2. See ABA Antitrust Section: Monograph No. 17, Franchise Protection: Laws
Against Termination and the Establishment of Additional Franchises 19 (1990)
[hereinafter ABA Monograph].
3. See infra, note 17. Additionally, many scholars distinguish dealerships (or
“product distribution franchises”) from franchises where the franchisees more
closely adhere to a defined business model (the “business format franchise,” such
as a fast food restaurant franchise). See Thomas J. Chinonis, Implied Covenant of
Good Faith: A Two-Way Street in Franchising, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 229, 233 (1998).
Because the arguments in this note apply to either arrangement, I shall use the
terms “franchise” and “dealership” interchangeably.
4. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical
Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 564–
65 (1998).
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5

at least in certain sectors. Many of these statutes protect against
arbitrary termination or nonrenewal by the franchisor by requiring
6
the franchisor to first show “good cause.” In Minnesota, for
example, the Heavy and Utility Equipment Manufacturers and
Dealers Act (HUEMDA) protects heavy-truck dealers by prohibiting
manufacturers from terminating or electing not to renew a
7
dealership without a showing of “good cause.”
The meaning of “good cause” in franchise protection statutes
is fertile ground for litigation. In River Valley Truck Center, Inc. v.
8
Interstate Cos., the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the issue of
whether the action of a third party, which was outside the control
of the dealer, amounted to “good cause” that could justify the
manufacturer’s nonrenewal of the dealership agreement. The
court held that the decision of a third-party manufacturer to
change its own product line could serve as the sole basis for
another manufacturer to deny the renewal of its agreement with a
9
dealer who represented both parties.
This note first gives a brief overview of the reasons for, and the
history of, legislation that protects dealers in dealership
10
agreements. It then discusses the River Valley Truck Center decision
and the implications of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
11
conclusion. It argues that the court wrongly decided River Valley
Truck Center, in that the court’s holding diminished the protection
intended for dealers under HUEMDA and deprived them of their
opportunities to cure noncompliance with their dealership
12
agreements. This note also suggests that the holding arose from
misplaced concerns about overprotecting dealers at the expense of

5. See Boyd Allan Byers, Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise
Terminations—A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. CORP. L. 607, 626–27 (1994).
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.068–.0684 (2004). The Minnesota legislature has
also enacted a generally applicable franchise-protection statute, the Minnesota
Franchise Act. See MINN. STAT. § 80C.14 (2004).
8. 704 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 2005).
9. Id. International, a truck manufacturer, decided to stop offering
Interstate’s engines in its trucks. Id. at 156. Interstate then notified its dealers
who sold International trucks that it would not renew their dealership agreements,
on the grounds that they could not comply with the terms of their Interstate
dealership agreements while still honoring their International dealership
agreements. Id.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
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13

manufacturers. This note concludes that a holding in favor of the
dealership would have been fair and practicable and would not
14
have imposed an unfair burden on the manufacturer.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Importance and Benefits of the Franchise Model
The franchise system has been called “the most dynamic
15
The advantages
business arrangement since the corporation.”
and successes of the franchising system suggest that it may
represent an optimal blend between small business and big
16
business. In 2004, the number of franchised businesses exceeded
760,000, representing nearly ten percent of the U.S. private-sector
17
economy.
Franchises are a popular business model for small
18
19
business operators and franchisors alike. Franchising also has an
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Byers, supra note 5, at 608 (quoting Franchising in the U.S. Economy: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Small Bus., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) (statement of Rep.
John LaFalce, Member, Comm. on Small Bus.)).
16. The franchise relationship has been described as “the perfect marriage
between big business and the small businessman: the franchisor obtains new
sources of expansion capital, new distribution markets, and self-motivated vendors
of its products, while the franchisee acquires the products, expertise, stability, and
marketing savvy usually reserved only for larger enterprises.” Additionally,
franchising benefits consumers by providing competitive pricing, convenient
locations, and consistency in the products available at various locations. Jefferson
I. Rust, Note, Regulating Franchise Encroachment: An Analysis of Current and Proposed
Legislative Solutions, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 489, 492 (1996) (quoting David J.
Kaufmann, Business Strategies and Compliance Issues, in FRANCHISING 1990, at 17 (PLI
Commercial Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 525, 1990)).
17. The International Franchise Association commissioned Price Waterhouse
Coopers to study the economic impact of the franchise sector. Using 2001 data,
the study found that the franchise businesses directly accounted for ten percent of
the U.S. private-sector economy, and indirectly accounted for even more. See
William L. Killion, What Red Ball Jets, Attitude, and a New IFA Study Mean for
Franchisor Trial Lawyers, 23 FRANCHISE LAW JOURNAL 196, 196–97 (2004); see also SelfEvaluation: Is Franchising for You?, FRANCHISING WORLD, Apr., 2005, at 14.
18. See David Hess, Comment, The Iowa Franchise Act: Towards Protecting
Reasonable Expectations of Franchisees and Franchisors, 80 IOWA L. REV. 333, 338–39
(1995). Franchisees enjoy the benefits of a proven business model, elements of
large-business infrastructure (such as favorable pricing agreements), national
exposure, recognizable trademarks, and immediate goodwill. Id.
19. See id. at 339. Along with an immediate capital investment from
franchisees in the form of franchise fees, franchisors gain a motivated
entrepreneurial workforce, sometimes with immediate local market expertise and
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intangible effect on the economy, in that it serves as a path to
business ownership for those who lack the money (or the stomach)
to go at it alone. Government officials, and often franchisors, too,
tout franchising opportunities as accessible means by which the
20
aspiring entrepreneurs among us live the “American Dream.”
In theory, the franchise arrangement is a winning solution for
both parties. The franchisee buys into a business with a likelihood
of profitability but which requires less capital and knowledge than
21
would be required to start a business anew.
By investing in a
franchise, the franchisee can enjoy more autonomy than would a
business manager employed by the company, yet the franchisee
exposes itself to less risk than an entrepreneur starting a business
22
from scratch. Similarly, the franchisor can leverage the capital
23
investments of the franchisees to grow its business more quickly.
The franchisor can also leverage the independence and local
market expertise of its franchisees instead of having to manage its
24
far-flung locations directly.
Further synergies between the two
develop as a result of economies of scale as the web of franchises
form a more effective whole, with greater buying power,
25
promotional ability, and a more efficient distribution network.
B. Drawbacks of the Franchise Model
Despite the mutually beneficial nature of the franchise
arrangement, the interests of the franchisor and the franchisee are
not necessarily in harmony. In return for the benefits of an
entrepreneurial workforce, the franchisor must forgo immediate
26
oversight of a franchise’s operations to the franchisee. But the
value of the franchisor’s trademark, the asset that attracts
franchisees in the first place, depends on the quality and

established local goodwill. Id.
20. Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise
Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 140 (2004). Steinberg and Lescatre use
such quotes with a degree of irony as they describe how the “American Dream”
can become a nightmare for the unwary franchisee. See id. at 140–41.
21. See Rust, supra note 16, at 492-93.
22. See Byers, supra note 5, at 619.
23. See Hess, supra note 18, at 339.
24. See Byers, supra note 5, at 616–17.
25. See id. at 619.
26. See Mary deLeo, Note, Emasculating Goliath: Did Postal Instant Press v.
Sealy Strike an Unfair Blow at the Franchising Industry?, 25 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 127
(1997).
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consistency of the goods and services that franchisees provide to
27
28
the customer. For this and other reasons, franchisors frequently
advocate for the power to exercise their own discretion over
29
termination and nonrenewal of franchises. While the franchisor
may see these measures as its most powerful means to protect its
30
standards and goodwill, the franchisee typically abhors the
31
consequences.
The effects of termination and nonrenewal on the franchisee
32
are onerous. Accordingly, a franchisee might be willing to accept
draconian terms in a renewal agreement simply to keep from losing
33
its franchise. Advocates for the franchisee frequently point out
that, because franchisors have more sophistication and experience
in crafting agreements, franchisees are prone to entering into
contracts that place the franchisor’s interests above their own,
34
especially in regard to termination or nonrenewal clauses.
Because the consequences of losing a franchise are potentially dire
for franchisees, the franchisor can wield its termination powers to
control its franchisees’ business operations, or even to exploit its
35
franchisees outright.
Where the circumstances encourage
inequitable contracts, advocates argue, legislation protecting the
franchisees is necessary.
27. Id. at 127–28.
28. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 5–6. Other reasons for a franchisor
to terminate or elect not to renew a franchise include creating disincentives for
underperformance among franchisees and improving its own ability to react to
market forces. Id. at 6–8.
29. See Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for
Franchisors, 45 BUS. LAW. 289, 292 (1989).
30. See Byers, supra note 5, at 620.
31. One consequence of termination or nonrenewal of the franchise to the
franchisee can be a drastic reduction or even a total loss of the franchisee’s equity
in its business. See id. at 621. “In effect, the power to terminate a franchise
typically is also the power to destroy the franchisee's business.” Emerson, supra
note 4, at 575.
32. Termination or nonrenewal of the franchise casts the franchisee’s future
in serious doubt. The time, money, and effort that the franchisee expends to
establish its franchise are lost. See Hess, supra note 18, at 343–44. Many of the
investments a franchisee might retain are unique to the franchise and of little
value outside of it. See Byers, supra note 5, at 621. Worse, the more resources a
franchisee has invested in its franchise, the more it stands to lose when the
franchise is terminated. See David A. Eisenberg, Balancing a Relationship—“Good
Cause” Termination of Franchise Agreements in Michigan, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 369,
370 (1995).
33. See Emerson, supra note 4, at 574–75.
34. See Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 20, at 152.
35. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 29.
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Franchisors’ Response

On the other hand, advocates for the franchisors argue that
franchise protection statues are harmful to the franchise
36
environment as a whole.
They maintain that the power to
terminate or elect not to renew a non-conforming, or “rogue,”
37
franchise is crucial to maintaining quality control and ensures
38
franchisee performance. They add that effective use of this power
works to the benefit of all. When individual franchisees sell
substandard products and services, such practices reflect poorly not
39
only on the franchisor but on other franchisees as well. Advocates
also argue that statutory curtailment of a franchisor’s ability to
terminate or elect not to renew a franchise would significantly
40
increase the costs of business in the franchise sector.
Such
legislation, they argue, would operate as a barrier to new entrants
in the franchise industry, and would have negative effects on
41
consumers and small businesses.
Additionally, advocates for franchisors argue that franchise
protection legislation is unwarranted, in part because franchisors
are not as willing to terminate franchises as the proponents of
42
legislation suggest.
After all, franchisors want to grow their
businesses, and terminating a franchise works against not only the
43
franchisee’s interests but the franchisor’s own interests as well. As
to unequal bargaining power, the advocates point out that
franchisees can have nearly as much in the way of resources and
44
sophistication as franchisors.
Finally, advocates argue that
36. See generally Hess, supra note 18, at 351–52.
37. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 5–6.
38. See id. at 7 (citing Richard Smith, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis
of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 129 (1982)
(describing the threat of lost investment to the franchisee as a “performance
bond”)).
39. See Theodore Frank, The Economic Interest Test and Collective Action Problems
in Antitrust Tie-In Cases, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 650 (1994).
40. See Andrew A. Caffey, The Proposed Uniform Franchise Act: The Franchisor
Viewpoint, FRANCHISE L. J., Spring 1986, at 7, 8.
41. See id.
42. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 2, at 37.
43. “[T]ermination of a franchise is typically a costly and unsatisfactory result
for the franchisor.” Lewis G. Rudnick & Donald L. Weaver, Can a Franchise
Agreement Be Both Fair and Effective?, in BUILDING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS: A GUIDE
TO ANTICIPATING PROBLEMS, RESOLVING CONFLICTS, AND REPRESENTING CLIENTS 3, 61
(Ann Hurwitz & Rochelle Buchsbaum Spandorf eds., 1998).
44. Advocates for franchisors also point to a number of practices that
challenge the notion that franchisees necessarily occupy weaker bargaining
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competition in the franchise market acts as a mechanism for
controlling abuses. Where franchise opportunities abound, abusive
45
franchisors will eventually be squeezed from the marketplace.
Moreover, advocates for the franchisors argue, effective legal
means of dealing with abuses already exist outside of franchise
46
protection laws. Naturally, much of the franchise relationship is
47
governed by contract law, which provides protection against
48
unconscionable abuses of bargaining power in an agreement and
a means for the franchisee to sue for bad faith activity by the
49
franchisor.
Some commentators also challenge franchise
terminations and nonrenewals as unreasonable restraints of trade
50
under antitrust law. Finally, there are other less intrusive forms of
franchise litigation, such as franchise disclosure laws, which protect
51
franchisees by forewarning them.
C. Enter the Real World
Commentators continue to debate whether franchisees
actually experience the abuses that are debated in theory.
Franchisors predictably argue that the incidence of abuse is too low

positions. There is, of course, an advantage to having a successful businessperson
running part of your business, as opposed to a novice. Accordingly, franchisors
will attempt to lure these franchisees, which are likely to have significant capital
and experience, with more favorable terms. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 2, at
31 (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 55 (1978); Mathewson & White, The
Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985)). Aside from the fact
that some franchisees have considerable resources and sophistication, there are
also some franchisors that work only with franchisees that license to subordinate
operators (or “sub-franchisees”). These franchisees, in turn, may be wealthy and
savvy investors. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 29 (citing Braun, Policy Issues
of Franchising, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 155, 255 n.272 (1984)).
45. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 32.
46. See generally Joel Iglesias, Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing to Franchises, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1423, 1431 (2004).
47. “[F]ranchise law is simply a combination of contract law, common law,
administrative law, and statutory law.” Id.
48. See Byers, supra note 5, at 628.
49. See Iglesias, supra note 46, at 1424–25.
50. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 9. See also Charles J. Faruki, The
Defense of Terminated Dealer Litigation: A Survey of Legal and Strategic Considerations, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 973 (1985) (noting that termination “frequently underlies
alleged violation of both franchise laws and antitrust laws”).
51. See Theodore M. Becker & Michael J. Boxerman, Franchise Renewals:
Considerations for Franchisors and Franchisees, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 45, 45 (1999) (noting
that sixteen states, plus the District of Columbia, have disclosure laws that govern
the termination of franchises).
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to merit franchise regulation and cite studies painting the
relationships between franchisor and franchisee in a positive light
nationwide. For example, a 1993 study by the Small Business
Administration found a high degree of satisfaction among
franchisees with their franchise relationships and advised against
interfering with the growing franchise sector through further
52
legislation protecting franchisees. A Gallup poll conducted in the
same year found that only six percent of franchisees had a “poor”
53
working relationship with their franchisors.
Data gathered before the spread of franchise-protection
54
statutes, which began in the 1970s, presents a clearer picture of
the potential for abuse. In fact, in 1978 the Small Business
Administration (SBA) noted that the franchise industry was
55
“plagued” with abuse by franchisors. But the change in tone of
the SBA, accompanied by the growth in franchise-protection
legislation since 1978, may actually suggest that franchise
relationships have improved because of, and not in spite of,
56
litigation governing the franchise relationship.
The political element of franchise legislation may tip the scale
of the debate towards the franchisees, even though the franchisors
57
typically have greater access to legislators. The populist element
52. David J. Kaufmann, Statistics Refute Franchising Abuses, N.Y. L.J., July 22,
1993, at 3–4.
53. Id. But Kaufman notes that the Gallup poll was financed by a group
representing franchisors, the International Franchise Association. Id.
54. See Tracey A. Nicastro, How the Cookie Crumbles: The Good Cause Requirement
for Terminating a Franchise Agreement, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 785, 788 (1994).
55. The franchise industry has been plagued by numerous abuses and
misrepresentations aimed at unsophisticated prospective franchisees.
Widespread instances have been documented involving such
malpractices as high pressure franchise transactions, unscrupulous and
experienced franchisors, using hidden fee requirements and kickbacks,
failure to provide information on services and training to be furnished to
the franchisee, and the use of coercive methods to get quick, large
deposits.
Lorin M. Kleeger, Judicial Interpretation of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act:
Conflict and Diversity, 32 EMORY L.J. 273, 275 n.9 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 59, 625 (Jan.
3, 1978)).
56. David Hess argues that "good cause" legislation can improve the franchise
relationship by fostering more security and confidence among franchisees, who in
turn may invest more in their franchises to the benefit of both parties. See Hess,
supra note 18, at 352. The threat of arbitrary termination, on the other
hand, may dissuade franchisees from investing and performing to the extent that
they otherwise might. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 66-67.
57. See Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 20, at 128. But see Jean Wegman
Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597,
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of the debate, which argues that smaller individual actors in the
economy are inherently “better” and thus worthy of protection,
58
figures prominently in legislative acts. Legal scholars debate the
59
merits of the “smaller is better” notion, but the balance of
rhetoric among legislatures has generally favored the small
60
businessperson over the large corporation. Ultimately, whether
based on sound policy or merely populist sentiment, legislatures in
many jurisdictions have decided that the balance of power in a
franchise relationship is so disparate as to require legislation to
61
protect the franchisee.
D. The Legislative Response and HUEMDA
The first attempt to protect franchisees from the effects of
termination and nonrenewal came in the form of the Federal
Fairness in Franchising Act, introduced by Senator Phillip A. Hart
62
of Michigan in 1969. While never adopted, the Act featured two
elements common to its later and more successful state analogs: (1)
written notice in advance of nonrenewal or termination; and (2) a
requirement that the franchisor show “good cause” for nonrenewal
63
or termination.
Congress subsequently passed protective legislation aimed at
64
65
franchisors in the automobile and petroleum industries, but a
66
federal law applying to franchises in general has yet to be enacted.
643–44 (1993)(noting that franchisors argue that franchisee’s association lobbies
are quite powerful).
58. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 27.
59. See id.
60. Franchise protection legislation, in particular, "tend[s] to be presented to
legislators and perceived in very emotional terms—vulnerable small business
versus overpowering big business—and so characterized continue to find much
popularity in state legislatures.” See Byers, supra note 5, at 640 n.210 (quoting
Andrew A. Caffey, Franchise Termination and Nonrenewal Legislation: Recent
Developments and Trends in State Legislation, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1343, 1343 (1980)).
61. See Byers, supra note 5, at 624–25; See, e.g., Franchise Practices Act, ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-72-201 to -210 (2001); Franchise Relations Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 20000–20043 (West 1997).
62. See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 372.
63. See id.
64. Federal Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1225
(2000).
65. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2806 (2000).
66. See Byers, supra note 5, at 626. Another attempt at providing uniform
national protection of franchisees was made more recently. The Small Business
Franchise Act, H.R. 3308, which contained a number of sweeping provisions
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In addition, many states have followed suit to protect particular
67
industries. Nineteen states have considered franchisee-protection
68
statutes, seventeen states have enacted generally applicable
69
statutory protection for franchisees, and fifteen states require
“good cause” or some variant thereof for termination or
70
nonrenewal.
Similar to federal regulation, state statutes
protecting certain industries are easier to get through state
legislatures than statutes that protect franchises as a whole.
Numerous state laws protect such industries as petroleum,
alcoholic beverage distribution, farm equipment dealers, and
71
motor vehicle dealers.
In Minnesota, dealers in the heavy-truck industry receive
protection under Heavy and Utility Equipment Manufacturers and
Dealers Act (HUEMDA), which requires manufacturers to show
“good cause” for terminating or electing not to renew a dealership
72
agreement.
HUEMDA defines “good cause” as failure by the
dealer to “substantially comply with essential and reasonable
73
requirements” in the dealership agreement. Furthermore, it is a
intended to reduce fraud and abuse in the franchise industry, passed the U.S.
House of Representatives, but not the Senate. The Library of Congress:
THOMAS, H.R. 3308: Small Business Franchise Act of 1999, available at
http://thomas.loc. gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.+3308:.
67. See David Gurnick & Steve Vieux, Case History of the American Business
Franchise, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 37, 59 (1999).
68. See Byers, supra note 5, at 611.
69. Thomas J. Collin, State Franchise Laws and the Small Business Franchise Act of
1999: Barriers to Efficient Distribution, 55 BUS. LAW. 1699, 1700. See, e.g., Franchise
Practices Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-401to -410 (2003); Fair Dealership Law, WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 135.01–.07 (West 2001).
70. See Nicastro, supra note 54, at 786 n.6 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-204
(Michie 1991); CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE §§ 20020–20021 (West 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 42-133f (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 482E-6 (1985); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §
23-2-2.7-1 (West 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.7 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.1527 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14 (West Supp. 1992);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-53 (West 1991); MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.405 (Vernon 1990);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-404 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-564 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.180 (West Supp. 1993);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 135.03 (West 1989) (Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law)).
71. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 1.
72. Heavy and Utility Equipment Manufacturers and Dealers Act
(HUEMDA), MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.068–.0684 (2004).
73. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0681, subdiv. 1 (2004). The statute enumerates eight
circumstances that establish good cause: (1) dealer changes business structure
dealership without manufacturer’s consent; (2) bankruptcy or liquidation of
dealership; (3) dealer changes location of dealership without manufacturer’s
consent; (4) dealer defaults on a financial obligation to manufacturer; (5)
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violation of HUEMDA for a manufacturer to terminate or fail to
renew a dealership agreement based on “a natural disaster, a labor
74
dispute, or other circumstance beyond the dealer’s control.”
75
In River Valley Truck Center Inc. v. Interstate Cos., the Minnesota
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether third-party actions
constitute the type of circumstance “beyond the dealer’s control”
excluded from the “good cause” definition of HUEMDA.
III. THE RIVER VALLEY TRUCK CENTER DECISION
A. Facts
Prior to 2002, River Valley Truck Center, Inc., (River Valley)
was a dealer of Detroit Diesel engines through its dealership
agreement with Interstate Companies, Inc., d/b/a Interstate
76
Detroit Diesel (Interstate). River Valley was also an authorized
dealer of heavy-duty trucks manufactured by the International
77
Truck and Engine Corporation (International). Like most heavyduty truck manufacturers at that time, International offered Detroit
78
In April 2002,
Diesel engines as an option to its customers.
International announced it would stop offering Detroit Diesel
79
engines in its new trucks.
International instructed its dealers,
including River Valley, to persuade their customers to use engines
80
made by other manufacturers.
River Valley joined other
International dealers in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade
81
International to reconsider its decision.
Several months later, River Valley’s dealership with Interstate
suffered the consequences of International’s choice. In November
2002, Interstate notified its International dealers in the region,
including River Valley, that it would not renew their dealership
82
agreements for 2003.
Interstate decreed that honoring
dealership is abandoned; (6) felony conviction of the dealer; (7) dealer engages in
conduct that is harmful to its customers or the public; (8) dealer fails to meet
manufacturer’s market penetration requirements. Id. at subdiv. 1(a)–(h).
74. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0682(b)(4) (2004).
75. 704 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 2005).
76. Id. at 156.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 156–57.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 166.
82. Id. at 157.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss2/6

12

Frazey: Contracts-When "Good Cause"? Goes Bad: Minnesota Restricts Protec
9. FRAZEY - RC.DOC

2007]

3/7/2007 1:08:38 PM

RIVER VALLEY TRUCK CTR., INC. V. INTERSTATE COS.

723

International’s decision precluded these dealerships from meeting
their obligations to Interstate to sell and promote Detroit Diesel
83
engines.
River Valley sued for an injunction to prevent Interstate from
84
failing to renew its dealership agreement. Interstate maintained
that, as a result of International’s decision, River Valley could no
longer comply with the “Sales and Promotion Responsibilities”
85
section of their dealership agreement.
Both River Valley and
Interstate agreed that the district court could decide the case
86
without a trial, based on the facts presented.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Interstate, holding that because River Valley’s relationship with
International now required them to sell trucks with competing
engines, Interstate had good cause to terminate River Valley’s
87
dealership. In effect, the district court found that River Valley
88
and Interstate had become competitors. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed, finding that Interstate had “good cause” under
HUEMDA to fail to renew River Valley’s dealership even though
any failure to comply with its dealership with Interstate was
89
unintentional.
Moreover, while HUEMDA prohibited
manufacturers from failing to renew a dealership for “the results of
a natural disaster, a labor dispute, or other circumstances beyond
the dealer’s control,” the court held that River Valley’s
noncompliance was not based on circumstances beyond its control
because River Valley could comply by ceasing to represent
90
International. Accordingly, River Valley petitioned the Minnesota
91
Supreme Court for review.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 158.
85. Id. at 159. This agreement provided: (1) River Valley would “actively and
effectively [promote] the sale of” Detroit Diesel products; (2) if River Valley
represented a manufacturer offering Detroit Diesel engines in its products, it
would promote and appropriately stock such products. Id.
86. Id. at 158.
87. River Valley Truck Ctr. v. Interstate Cos., 680 N.W.2d 99, 103 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004), aff’d 704 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 2005).
88. In fact, the district court stated that by maintaining its International
dealership, River Valley had “undertaken its obligation to participate in driving
Detroit Diesel out of business.” Id. at 103.
89. Id. at 107.
90. Id. at 105 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 325E.0682(b)(4)(2002)).
91. River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 154.
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B. The Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in granting River Valley’s
petition for review, first examined the issue of whether
International’s decision provided Interstate with “good cause” to
92
fail to renew River Valley’s Detroit Diesel dealership agreement.
The court said that even though HUEMDA listed eight
circumstances establishing “good cause” for failure to renew a
dealership agreement, none of these circumstances existed in River
93
Valley’s case.
94
The court nonetheless found good cause for termination.
Turning to the dealership agreement between River Valley and
Interstate, the court found that River Valley could not possibly
meet the first requirement in the “Sales and Promotion
Responsibilities” section so long as it maintained International
95
exclusively as its truck manufacturer. As such, River Valley could
not substantially comply with its Detroit Diesel dealership
agreement, and Interstate therefore had “good cause” to refuse to
96
renew River Valley’s dealership agreement.
Next, the court revisited the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
analysis of whether HUEMDA, which prohibits a manufacturer
from refusing to renew a dealership agreement based on
97
“circumstances beyond the dealer’s control,” precluded Interstate
from refusing to renew its dealership agreement due to
98
The court interpreted “other
International’s decision.
circumstances” to mean only circumstances that temporarily
99
prevented the dealer’s compliance with the dealership agreement.
The court based this reading on interpretations of similar statutes
100
101
102
in other states (such as Iowa, Arkansas, and North Dakota )

92. Id. at 158–61.
93. Id. at 159 n.4.
94. Id. at 162.
95. Id. at 159–61.
96. Id. at 162.
97. See MINN. STAT. § 325E.0682(b)(4) (2004).
98. See River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 161–62.
99. Id. at 161. Justice Russell Anderson, in his dissent, rejected the idea that
the legislature intended this phrase to mean only temporary circumstances. Id. at
167 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 161 (citing IOWA CODE § 322F.7(7)(a)(2004)).
101. Id. (citing S. Implement Co., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 122 F.3d 503, 508 (8th
Cir. 1997)).
102. Id. (citing N.D. CENT CODE. § 51-07-01.2(5) (2005)).
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103

and also on public policy grounds.
The court argued that the
purpose of HUEMDA was to create a level playing field between
104
manufacturers and dealers and that requiring manufacturers to
place dealers’ interests ahead of their own, indefinitely if not
permanently, would tilt the balance of power unfairly toward the
105
dealers and subvert the purpose of the statute.
Additionally, the court upheld the Minnesota Court of
Appeals’ judgment that River Valley’s noncompliance with its
dealership agreement was not beyond its control, as River Valley
could have found another manufacturer to represent that could
106
offer Detroit Diesel engines in its products. Therefore, the court
held that Interstate’s failure to renew River Valley’s dealership
107
agreement met the “good cause” requirement, and did not
violate HUEMDA’s prohibition against the nonrenewal of a
108
dealership for reasons beyond a dealer’s control.
In the dissent, two justices joined Justice Russell Anderson in
taking issue with the majority’s findings that River Valley was not in
109
compliance with its dealership agreement
and that the
“circumstances beyond the dealer’s control” provision of HUEMDA
110
was limited to temporary circumstances. As to the argument that
103. Id. at 161–62.
104. Id. at 162 (citing Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 8, 11–12 (Wis.
1988)). The court sought support for its policy argument by turning to an
interpretation of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (“WFDL”), “on which
HUEMDA was apparently patterned.” Id. at 161.
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. In fact, a strict interpretation of “beyond the dealer’s control” is
problematic. One of the examples of “circumstances beyond the dealers control”
provided in HUEMDA is a labor dispute. Brief and Addendum for Appellant at 23,
River Valley Truck Ctr. v. Interstate Cos., 704 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 2005) (No. A031273) (citing MINN. STAT. § 325E.0682(b)(4) (2004)). But as River Valley noted in
their brief, a dealer’s ability to resolve a labor dispute is always in its control,
though in reality a settlement that resolves the dispute might be unpalatable to the
dealer. Id.
107. River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 161.
108. Id. at 161.
109. Justice Anderson’s analysis of the dealership agreement led him to
conclude that its terms allowed River Valley to comply by promoting the service of
Detroit Diesel engines and the sale of Detroit Diesel replacement engines and
parts, even though they could no longer sell trucks equipped with Detroit Diesel
engines. Id. at 164 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 167. Justice Anderson argued that the majority’s interpretation of
the statute was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and noted that
determining whether a circumstance was temporary or permanent may be
difficult. Id. He also argued that this interpretation weakens HEUMDA’s ability to
serve another of its purposes, protecting the dealer. Id. Finally, he noted that the
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River Valley could comply with its dealership agreement by
representing a manufacturer other than International, Justice
Anderson argued that finding another manufacturer in the time
period Interstate required would have been a “practical
111
impossibility.”
Though Justice Anderson stated that his opinion
was grounded in “basic contract construction and statutory
112
interpretation,” an important public policy argument appeared at
numerous points in his opinion: the manufacturer should not be
allowed to terminate a dealership agreement unless the dealer has
113
had a meaningful opportunity to comply with the agreement.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RIVER VALLEY TRUCK CENTER DECISION
A. Balancing the Interests of the Manufacturer and Dealer
The purpose of HUEMDA was to create a level playing field
between the franchisor and the franchisee by protecting the
114
franchisee. Similarly, both the majority and dissenting opinions
in River Valley Truck Center alluded to HUEMDA’s purpose of
115
bringing balance to the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
For
example, the majority justified its finding that the “other
116
should be narrowly
circumstances” clause in HUEMDA
117
construed by comparing this clause to statutes with similar clauses
definition of “good cause” in HUEMDA was stricter than that in the Wisconsin Fair
Dealership Law, and therefore the Minnesota legislature meant to provide greater
protection to dealers in HUEMDA than the WFDL. Id. at 167–68.
111. Id. at 168.
112. Id. at 169.
113. Id. at 167–69.
114. See Astleford Equip. Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 632 N.W.2d 182,
191 (Minn. 2001).
115. See 704 N.W.2d at 162 (finding the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Wis. 1988) of the
purpose of the WFDL as “equaliz[ing] the power of dealers and grantors and not
to insulate dealers from all economic reality”); see also id. at 167 (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (citing Astleford in noting that HUEMDA was intended to protect the
dealer in light of the superior bargaining position of the manufacturer).
116. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0682(b)(4) (2004). The statute reads:
It is a violation of [this subchapter] for an equipment manufacturer to . .
. attempt or threaten to terminate, cancel, fail to renew, or substantially
change the competitive circumstances of the dealership agreement if the
attempt or threat based on the results of a natural disaster, a labor
dispute, or other circumstances beyond the dealer’s control.
Id.
117. River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 161.
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from Arkansas, Iowa, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.
The
Arkansas statute, for example, allowed a change in the
manufacturer’s relationship with the dealer to satisfy “good
122
cause.” The River Valley majority echoed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in defining the purpose of dealer protection statutes as to
provide parity between dealers and manufacturers and not to
123
protect dealers per se.
Justice Anderson’s dissent, on the other
hand, addressed balance from the perspective of the dealer, noting
that the intent of HUEMDA was to protect the dealer from the
124
superior bargaining position of the manufacturer.
Balance, as harmonious as it sounds, is inherently subjective in
its perception and execution. But Justice Anderson’s perception of
balance was clearly supported by the intent of HUEMDA. Several
prior decisions have established the intent of HUEMDA to be
125
protection for the dealer.
That the terms of HUEMDA itself
contain numerous provisions safeguarding the dealer implies the
126
The point of HUEMDA’s “good cause”
same purpose.
requirement is that protection against arbitrary termination or
nonrenewal is necessary to prevent abusive actions by the
127
manufacturer.
The court’s explanation of how its decision struck a just
balance between the interests of manufacturer and dealer is
unsatisfactory. Understandably, a manufacturer wishes to avoid
118. Id. (citing S. Implement Co. v. Deere Co., 122 F.3d 503, 508 (8th Cir.
1997) (discussing Arkansas Farm Equipment Retailer Franchise Protection Act,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-310) (West 2006)).
119. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 322F.7(7)(a) (2004) (including drought, flood,
and economic recession as among "conditions beyond the dealer's control")).
120. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-01.2(5) (2004) (“including ‘sustained
drought or other natural disaster in the dealership market area’ as examples of
‘circumstance[s] beyond the farm equipment dealer's control’")).
121. Id. at 161–62 (citing Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 8, 11–12
(Wis. 1988)).
122. S. Implement Co., 122 F.3d at 508.
123. River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 162 (quoting Ziegler Co., 433 N.W.2d
at 11–12).
124. See id. at 168 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Midwest Great Dane Trailers v. Great Dane Ltd. P’ship, 977 F.
Supp. 1386, 1394 (D. Minn. 1997) (citing Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 548
N.W.2d 519, 524–25 (Wis. 1996)); see also Astleford Equip. Co. v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 632 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Minn. 2001).
126. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.0681–325E.0684 (2004).
127. See Hess, supra note 18, at 358–59. “While the franchisee cannot
reasonably expect a perpetual franchise agreement, wide discretion for the
franchisor to refuse renewal creates a large opportunity for abuse.” Id.
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being permanently subject to an arrangement that runs contrary to
its interests. But the majority in River Valley Truck Center, in its
abhorrence to create such an arrangement, overestimated the
implications for manufacturers that would have resulted from a
decision in favor of the dealer. The court also underestimated the
implications of its decision on the dealer, which lost a viable
business through no fault of its own.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Finding Imposes a Hardship on
Dealers
i.

Exacerbating Imbalance Between Dealers and Manufacturers

Whether or not franchisors tend to abuse their positions, the
nature of franchising leaves little doubt that franchisors do, at
times, abuse their positions. Furthermore, while franchisees are
typically required to meet a number of conditions in their franchise
agreements (such as sales quotas and the like), franchisors do not
share the same responsibilities. While a franchisor may sanction an
underperforming franchisee, a franchisee is usually powerless to
correct a poorly managed franchisor, even though the effects may
weigh more heavily on the franchisee in the latter situation than on
128
the franchisor in the former.
But the imbalance runs deeper than that. A “structural
inevitability” of franchising is the fact that the franchisee depends
129
on the franchisor not only for materials essential to the business,
which the franchisee frequently can only purchase through the
130
131
franchisor, but also for such things as land and financing.
Furthermore, at least part of the franchisee’s business depends on
the continuance of the franchise. But despite the degree to which
the franchisee depends on the franchisor, the franchisor is
generally not bound to respect the reasonable expectation of the
franchisee that, in return for its dependence, the franchisee can
132
continue to operate as long as it satisfies its agreement.
133
Franchisors owe no fiduciary duty to franchisees, and no other
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
Circuit

See Hess, supra note 18, at 341–42.
See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 34–35.
Id.
Id.
See Hess, supra note 18, at 355.
See Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 20, at 285. In fact, though the Eighth
decreed that a fiduciary relationship was inherent in a franchise
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duty to honor the franchisee’s expectations is likely to come from
134
the franchise agreement itself or from contract law governing
135
it. Hence, the purpose of “good cause” legislation is not to offer
blanket protection to the franchisee, but to protect the franchisee’s
136
reasonable expectations.
But in finding for the manufacturer in River Valley Truck Center,
the court weakened HUEMDA’s “good cause” standard. When, as
the court would have it, “good cause” expands to include nearly
any permanent or indefinite circumstance beyond the dealer’s
137
control, the franchisee’s business becomes vulnerable to those
circumstances in a way that the franchisor’s business does not. As a
result of the court’s holding, the franchisee’s interests can come to
a quick end due to outside circumstances to which an independent
business, not to mention the franchisor, could reasonably adjust.
The court in River Valley Truck Center erroneously created not
only an expansive definition of “good cause” but also an opening
for franchisors to draft broader termination and nonrenewal
138
clauses in their agreements.
As a result of this holding, a clause
allowing for termination based on circumstances beyond the
dealer’s control (such as third-party actions) would be valid and
139
enforceable in a dealership agreement.
Because courts tend to
defer to the terms of a contract, the effect might be to keep such
relationship in Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980), the court strictly limited that finding in Bain v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir. 1982). See Furaki, supra note 50, at
975. Courts since Bain have been unfriendly to the proposition that franchise
relationships are fiduciary in nature. Id.
134. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1509 n.21 (1990) (noting the franchisor usually drafts the
franchise agreement and that most obligations fall on the franchisee).
135. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty
of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C.L. REV. 905, 907 (1994) (finding that, where
courts encounter contract clauses that suggest a franchise relationship that is
fiduciary in nature, they only “quickly examine whether the parties acted in good
faith and exercised fair dealing”).
136. See Hess, supra note 18, at 355.
137. Certain permanent circumstances beyond the dealer’s control, such as
bankruptcy of a dealer, would still be excluded by HUEMDA. See MINN. STAT. §
325E.0681, subdiv. 1 (2004).
138. See Pitegoff, supra note 29, at 318 (describing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s similar decision in Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1988), as
creating a “broader freedom to contract”).
139. But a caveat exists. HUEMDA requires that “good cause” means failure by
the dealer to comply with “essential and reasonable requirements.” MINN. STAT. §
325E.0681, subdiv. 1 (2004).
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clauses insulated from contract law principles such as the implied
140
While no franchisor could anticipate all
covenant of good faith.
of the circumstances in which it would prefer to terminate a
141
franchise, the more likely and easily foreseeable circumstances
142
could still become part of a franchise agreement.
ii. No Meaningful Opportunity to Comply
The purpose of the “other circumstances outside the dealer’s
control” clause is to protect the dealer in cases where the dealer
143
Critics of
has no practical opportunity to cure noncompliance.
“good cause” legislation argue that franchisors need discretion to
144
deal with changing conditions.
But this view also supports the
claim for regulating termination of franchises. Since the franchisee
typically has little control over the franchise relationship, it has
even less ability to adapt to new circumstances. Therefore, at the
very least, a franchisee should be protected from new or
unforeseen circumstances, unless it commits a material breach of
145
the franchise agreement.
It follows from this argument that a dealer should have a
meaningful opportunity to comply with the terms of its dealership
146
agreement. The terms of HUEMDA itself imply “good cause” by
the dealer’s failure to perform when given the opportunity, not
merely by the dealer’s inability to perform due to circumstances
147
beyond its control. Where the basis of “good cause” stems from
the actions of a third party, which inherently bring about
noncompliance, there is no opportunity for the dealer to cure the
140. See W. Michael Garner, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Franchising: A
Model For Discretion, 20 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 305, 310–11 (1995) (finding that the
implied covenant of good faith is applied inconsistently to franchise agreements,
with many courts applying it as a rule of construction or simply a curb on one
party’s discretion where it exists).
141. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 55.
142. Indeed, the majority decision in River Valley Truck Center implied that
Interstate’s dealership agreement adequately contemplated and covered
International’s decision to stop using the engines Interstate dealt. River Valley
Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Interstate Cos., 704 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Minn. 2005).
143. Id. at 167 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
144. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 34.
145. See id at 8.
146. See Wadena Implement Co. v. Deere & Co., 480 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (finding that “good cause” does not exist if a dealer had no
practical opportunity to fulfill the terms of the dealership agreement).
147. See supra note 73. Note that each of the eight circumstances listed refers
to actions or failures to act on the dealer’s part.
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148

situation. The franchisor has the opportunity to adjust to any
such circumstances. The franchisee, on the other hand, faces
termination without an opportunity to adjust. The River Valley
Truck Center decision denies dealers the protection of the
opportunity to adjust intended under HUEMDA. Without such
protection, the dealer cannot bring itself into compliance with its
149
dealership agreement.
iii. Dealers Who Represent Multiple Manufacturers
Dealers who represent more than one manufacturer are
particularly vulnerable to the holding in River Valley Truck Center.
Interstate argued, and the court agreed, that River Valley could
have complied with its dealership agreement by terminating its
150
dealership agreement with International. Forcing a dealer to
cancel other dealership agreements could, however, potentially
151
destroy the dealer’s business.
Furthermore, the unreasonable
nature of such a demand from a manufacturer is contrary to the
152
intent of the legislature.
In effect, the River Valley Truck Center
decision allows a manufacturer to coerce a dealer with the threat of
termination or nonrenewal to end or otherwise change its
153
relationships with other manufacturers. This sort of coercion can
be devastating to dealers and violates the terms of a different
section of HUEMDA, which prohibits manufacturers from coercing
154
a dealer to refuse equipment produced by another manufacturer.
C. A Finding for the Dealer in River Valley Truck Center Would Not
Have Unfairly Affected Manufacturers
Franchisors have their own set of worries regarding regulation
of the franchise agreement. For example, the manufacturers are
naturally averse to the possibility of being “locked” into dealership
148. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 9, River Valley Truck Ctr. v. Interstate Cos., 704
N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 2005) (No. A03-1273).
149. See Wadena Implement Co., 480 N.W.2d at 388.
150. Respondent’s Brief at 31–32, River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d 154 (No.
A03-1273); River Valley Truck Ctr. 704 N.W.2d at 162.
151. Appellant’s Brief & Addendum at 22–23, River Valley Truck Ctr., 704
N.W.2d 154 (No. A03-1273).
152. Id. at 23 (stating that “the legislature does not intend a result that is
absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”) (citing MINN. STAT. §
645.17(1) (2004)).
153. Id.
154. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0682 (2004).
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155

agreements with underperforming dealers.
And franchisors
themselves usually draft franchise agreements and craft the terms
156
to protect their interests. As a result, franchisors wish to preserve
157
their freedom to contract.
Franchisors also want to maintain
158
But a holding honoring
their ability to respond to the market.
the intended definition of “good cause” in HUEMDA would not
have compromised the interests of franchisors to the extent that
the court feared.
i.

The Unfounded Fear of Franchises in Perpetuity

The dissent in River Valley Truck Center interpreted HUEMDA
to mean that franchisors could neither terminate nor fail to renew
a franchise agreement absent the franchisee’s failure to
159
From the franchisor’s
substantially comply with the agreement.
perspective, this interpretation suggests the dangerous possibility of
a perpetual franchise, inescapable by the franchisor for any reason
160
so long as the franchisee remains in compliance.
The majority
decision alluded to this fear when the court warned against
“[r]equiring Interstate to put River Valley’s interests ahead of its
161
own, perhaps permanently.”
But a number of escape routes still exist for the franchisor.
Material breach caused by the dealer’s failure to comply and cure
noncompliance in a timely manner is still grounds for termination
162
or nonrenewal. Moreover, HUEMDA’s list of eight “good cause”
circumstances would still allow a manufacturer to refuse renewal of
a dealership agreement based on dealer non-compliance itself, so
long as the statute’s notice and right to cure provisions are

155. See Emerson, supra note 4, at 639.
156. See Emerson, supra note 134, at 1509 (stating that “[b]ecause the
franchise contract usually is determined by the franchisor . . . most of the express
contractual obligations fall upon the franchisee”).
157. See Emerson, supra note 4, at 641 (stating that franchisors “object to good
cause as impediments to their right to contract freely”).
158. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 64.
159. River Valley Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Interstate Cos., Inc., 704 N.W.2d 154, 168
(Minn. 2005) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
160. See Nicastro, supra note 54, at 790; see also ABA Monograph, supra note 2,
at 19. Note that some states with franchise protection laws require good cause for
termination, but not nonrenewal. Id. HUEMDA requires good cause for both. See
MINN. STAT § 325E.0681, subdiv. 1 (2004).
161. River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 162.
162. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0681, subdiv. 1 (2004).
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163

satisfied.
River Valley Truck Center does not preclude the
possibility that a manufacturer could terminate franchises as part of
164
a general market withdrawal from the area.
Furthermore, the remedies under statutes like HUEMDA are
165
likely to be limited to money damages or a temporary injunction.
This presents the franchisor with the opportunity to escape its
166
agreement via efficient breach.
In short, the franchisor can
accept money damages and related costs as part of the overall cost
of escaping the franchise. While franchisors may find this
arrangement unpalatable, the effects of termination are even more
167
disagreeable for the franchisee.
In addition, while HUEMDA
prohibits unilateral termination by the franchisor without “good
cause” there is no such requirement against a mutually agreed168
upon settlement that terminates the franchise. In other words, a
manufacturer can still extricate itself from a dealership under
HUEMDA without “good cause” by either negotiating a settlement
or assuming money damages. In either situation, the manufacturer
can evaluate the costs of termination and select the most efficient
outcome. A holding for the dealer in River Valley Truck Center
would have merely required that the manufacturer internalize the
cost of terminating a dealership without “good cause.”
ii. Freedom to Contract
The dissent in River Valley Truck Center would have invalidated
any term in a dealership agreement that allowed the manufacturer
to terminate or fail to renew the agreement for any reason other
169
than substantial noncompliance by the franchisee. Franchisors in
163. Id. at subdiv. 2.
164. Courts are divided as to whether termination of a franchise is done with
good cause as a result of general withdrawal from a market. See Nicastro, supra
note 54, at 796–97.
165. See Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48 (N.J.
1981). Courts would be reluctant to impose a permanent injunction that locks a
franchisor into a business agreement for fear of creating a taking. Id. at 56.
166. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions In Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 375, 435 n.188 (1990). “Note that legal intervention would not prevent
efficient breach of the franchise contract.” Id.
167. See Nicastro, supra note 54, at 790 (describing termination as affecting
franchisees who “spent large amounts of money and established a good business”
only to have franchisors “take the business, and reap the profits”).
168. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0681, subdiv.1 (2004).
169. River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 167 (Anderson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that allowing a manufacturer to terminate a dealership for any reason
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general would desire the ability to include such terms in their
agreements, especially since these terms favor the franchisor’s
170
interests.
Franchisors also argue that restrictions on their ability
to draft such terms discourage their involvement in the franchise
171
The law has
sector and reduce opportunities for franchisees.
long respected, with certain exceptions, the freedom of parties to
172
protect and bargain to satisfy their own interests in contracts. In
spite of this principal, the River Valley Truck Center dissent’s
interpretation of HUEMDA clearly interferes with the franchisor’s
and franchisee’s freedom to contract with one another.
Where public policy opposes certain types of contractual
173
promises, the law has regularly held them unenforceable.
For
example, certain promises in adhesion contracts, such as those that
arise from unequal bargaining power between the parties where
one party controls all the terms, have been held voidable by
174
Minnesota courts.
But even assuming that the franchisor
inherently occupies such a superior bargaining position relative to
175
the franchisee, a ruling that a contract is an adhesion contract
does not necessarily render its terms unenforceable. A court could
decide to only invalidate those terms it finds unconscionable or
176
that fall outside the reasonable expectations of the weaker party.

outside the dealer’s control is “inconsistent with the statutory scheme” of
HUEMDA).
170. See Emerson, supra note 134, at 1509.
171. See Emerson, supra note 135, at 926 n.79.
172. See E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1 (1982) (finding that the freedom
to contract is outweighed by public policy only occasionally).
173. “Public policy has been the announced rationale for striking down
contracts or contract clauses on grounds of immorality, unconscionability,
economic policy, unprofessional conduct and diverse other criteria.” JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22.1, at 843 (5th ed.
2003).
174. See, e.g., Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1982) (finding that forum-selection clauses in adhesion
contracts are unenforceable).
175. Indeed, HUEMDA assumes exactly that. See Astleford Equip. Co., Inc. v.
Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 632 N.W.2d 182, 191 (Minn. 2001); see also Postal
Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting that franchise agreements in general exhibit many of the attributes of an
adhesion contract).
176. See deLeo, supra note 26, at 152. See also, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court,
645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v.
Keating 465 U.S. 1 (1984)) (holding that even though the franchise contract at
issue was adhesive, the contract was enforceable because it fell within the parties’
reasonable expectations).
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While this may seem like a reasonable safeguard of the franchisee’s
interests, courts generally do not adequately recognize
177
unconscionability or failures of franchise agreements to meet the
178
reasonable expectations of the parties.
The common-law
approach to contracts does not take into account the realities of
179
franchising.
The effects on dealers of termination or nonrenewal,
therefore, justify an interpretation of HUEMDA that grants dealers
greater protection from unfavorable contract provisions than the
180
common law affords them.
While buy-back provisions in
181
franchise agreements and statutes such as HUEMDA may protect
the dealer’s investment in inventory, they generally fail to
compensate the dealer for significant losses, such as other lost
investments that were unique to the dealership or the loss of the
182
value of the business as a going concern.
Furthermore, a contractual approach to addressing franchisor
183
abuses may be inherently faulty. For one, a franchise agreement
could never encompass all of the reasonably likely circumstances
184
surrounding the termination of a franchise. In fact, the ongoing
177. Courts base findings of unconscionability on “unfair surprise” in the
agreement; and because terms in franchise agreements tend to be conspicuous,
courts will enforce the contract no matter how unconscionable the results. See
ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 58–59; see also Emerson, supra note 4, at 579.
178. Courts often mistakenly assume that parties to franchise agreements
allocate their risks efficiently. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of
Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 625–26 (1983).
179. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 59.
180. In fact, the Minnesota Legislature, acting to protect franchisees,
countermanded the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Modern Computer
Systems, Inc. v. Modern Banking Systems, Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989). The
court ruled that a forum-selection clause in a franchise agreement was
enforceable. Modern Computer Systems, 871 F.2d at 740. The Minnesota Legislature
countered this holding by voiding such clauses in the Minnesota Franchise Act
(MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (2004)). See James V. Jordan & Judith B. Gitterman,
Franchise Agreements: Contracts of Adhesion?, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 1, 43 (1996).
181. MINN. STAT. § 325E.0681, subdiv. 3 (2004) (imposing an obligation on the
manufacturer to repurchase at full value the dealer’s inventory that was bought
within twenty-four months prior to the manufacturer’s termination notice).
182. See Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 20, at 170.
183. See Warren S. Grimes, Market Definition in Franchise Antitrust Claims:
Relational Market Power and the Franchisor's Conflict of Interest, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243,
273–74 (1999) (arguing that contract law is ill-equipped to deal with antitrust
abuses and that the weaker position of the franchisee makes it less likely or able to
bring a contract claim in court).
184. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 29 (citing Goetz & Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092–94 (1981)).
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nature of the franchise relationship itself makes it impossible to
185
express within the confines of a single contract the many facets of
186
the relationship extending beyond contract law. Finally, because
substantial reasons exist to suggest that franchisees are considerably
less able than franchisors to represent their interests in a franchise
agreement, subjugating the franchisee’s interests to the franchisor’s
187
freedom to contract is inherently inequitable.
iii. Economic Efficiency
A third concern franchisors have about termination regulation
is that such regulation impedes their ability to respond to the
market. Again, however, a ruling for the dealer in River Valley Truck
Center would not have unfairly impeded this ability. To understand
franchisors’ concerns, suppose that Interstate had chosen to
terminate River Valley’s dealership, not as the result of any third
party’s actions, but because it identified factors that would make
River Valley’s region an unattractive market in the future. A nonfranchised business could make a decision to withdraw from the
market and concern itself with nothing outside of the logistics of
withdrawal. Interstate, if it were forced to honor its dealership
agreement, could only make the same withdrawal by incurring
188
additional costs.
Critics of franchise legislation argue that restrictions on the
ability to terminate or fail to renew create a drag effect on the
189
franchise sector of the economy.
A holding for the dealer in
HUEMDA, they would argue, locks the manufacturer into an
inefficient business arrangement. When termination becomes
costlier and riskier, they argue, the overall efficiency of the
190
franchise sector is damaged.

185. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 55.
186. Id. at 56 (arguing that, because the franchisee creates a business under
the demands of the franchisor, the franchisor has a duty under property law not to
harm such business).
187. See Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 20, at 240–41 (arguing that the power
imbalance between the franchisor and the franchisee, and courts’ tendencies to
honor the express terms of franchise agreements, invite bad faith behavior by the
franchisor).
188. But when a franchisor terminates franchises as part of a general market
withdrawal, courts may find that a franchisor has good cause. See Eisenberg, supra
note 32, at 391–92.
189. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 68–69.
190. See id. at 65.
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But franchise legislation also contributes to economic
191
In
efficiency by optimally allocating costs between the parties.
fairness, the franchisee’s termination costs should, to some degree,
be shifted to the franchisor so long as the franchisee has not
substantially failed to comply with its agreement. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that franchise-protection laws significantly
192
harm the franchise sector, which undermines the argument that
protecting the franchisee creates a palpable negative effect on the
franchise economy.
V. CONCLUSION
193

In Westfield Centre Service, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., the
Supreme Court of New Jersey opined that “disparity in the
bargaining power of the parties has led to some unconscionable
provisions in [franchise] agreements. Franchisors have drafted
contracts permitting them to terminate or to refuse renewal of
franchises at will or for a wide variety of reasons including failure to
194
comply with unreasonable conditions.”
Most jurisdictions
recognize a need to protect the interests of franchisees in certain
195
industries, if not in the franchise sector as a whole.
The
imbalance of the relationship in favor of the franchisor and the
risks of forfeiture justify further protection of the franchisee,
beyond that which courts applying contract law principles to the
franchise agreement would offer. The Minnesota Legislature
recognized this reality when they enacted franchise protection acts
196
such as the Minnesota Franchise Act and HUEMDA.
The River Valley Truck Center court took a step toward unsettling
the balance that the Minnesota Legislature sought to bring to the
191. See Hess, supra note 18, at 339.
192. See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 66; see also Steinberg & Lescatre,
supra note 20, at 286 (arguing that a franchise protection law in Ontario, Canada,
similar to the Small Business Franchising Act proposed in the U.S., has had no
negative effect on franchising in Ontario). But see James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates
and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
511, 532–33 (2002) (showing evidence that franchisees pay more for their
franchises in states that have franchise-protection laws).
193. 432 A.2d 48 (N.J. 1981).
194. Id. at 53.
195. See Edgar G. McQueen, Jr., The Choice-of-Law Dilemma in Franchising, 20
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 391, 396–97 (1995) (reflecting that most states have
recognized abuses in the industry and an inequality of bargaining power and have
thereafter made some effort to protect franchisees).
196. See supra note 180.
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franchise relationship. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in denying
protection under HUEMDA to a dealer torn between two
manufacturers that it represented, argued that applying the
definition of “good cause” as plainly stated in HUEMDA shielded
197
dealers from the realities of the economy. But as a result of their
decision, a manufacturer may terminate a dealership agreement
based not on the effects of a third-party’s decision, but on the
decision itself. The dealer has no control over another party’s
choice and, therefore, no meaningful opportunity to cure it.
Yet an opportunity to cure noncompliance with the dealership
agreement is central to the dealer’s reasonable expectations in
198
entering into the agreement. Rather than shielding dealers from
the realities of the market economy, a ruling for the dealer in River
Valley Truck Center would have more fairly accounted for the
realities of the franchise relationship. Permitting the dealer to
keep its dealership as long as it performs in a satisfactory manner
199
equitably protects the dealer’s expectations and investments.
Conversely, the freedom of the manufacturer to define the terms of
the dealership agreement, to respond to its market, and to
withdraw from franchise relationships would be hampered only by
its responsibility to honor the reasonable expectations of its
dealers.
The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is akin to
a partnership, wider and more complicated in fact than any
200
document could contain.
Yet in the absence of franchise
protection laws, courts tend to reduce that relationship to the
terms of a boilerplate contract drafted by the stronger of the two
parties. Legislatures have enacted franchise protection laws with
the intent to help the law reflect the actual nature of franchises. By
finding for the manufacturer in River Valley Truck Center, the
Minnesota Supreme Court took a step away from the intentions of
the Minnesota Legislature and a step towards inequity in the
franchise relationship.

197.
198.
199.
200.

River Valley Truck Ctr., 704 N.W.2d at 162.
See Hess, supra note 18, at 355.
Id.
See ABA Monograph, supra note 2, at 55.
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